prophets, bear a like testimony.
On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than
the worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful
regard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and
men, in life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest
authorities tell us. Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has
any superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be willing to
honour justice; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears
justice praised? And even if there should be some one who is able to
disprove the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that justice is
best, still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to
forgive them, because he also knows that men are not just of their own
free will; unless, peradventure, there be some one whom the divinity
within him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has
attained knowledge of the truth--but no other man. He only blames
injustice who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the
power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he
obtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.
The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning
of the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were
to find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice--beginning
dengan para pahlawan kuno yang kenangannya masih tersimpan di ingatan kita,
dan berakhir dengan laki-laki di zaman kita--tidak ada yang pernah menyalahkan
ketidakadilan atau keadilan yang dipuji kecuali dengan tujuan untuk kemuliaan,
kehormatan, dan manfaat yang mengalir darinya. Tidak ada seorang pun yang pernah secara memadai
menggambarkan baik dalam bentuk syair maupun prosa tentang hakikat hakiki dari keduanya
di antaranya berdiam di dalam jiwa, dan tak terlihat oleh mata manusia atau mata dewa mana pun;
atau menunjukkan bahwa dari semua hal yang ada dalam jiwa seseorang yang ada di dalam dirinya
baginya, keadilan merupakan kebaikan terbesar, dan ketidakadilan merupakan kejahatan terbesar.
Jika ini adalah jenis yang umum, apakah Anda mencoba meyakinkan kami
ini dari masa muda kita ke atas, kita seharusnya tidak berjaga-jaga untuk
saling menjaga agar tidak berbuat jahat, tetapi setiap orang akan menjadi miliknya sendiri
penjaganya sendiri, karena takut, jika dia berbuat salah, akan menimbulkan masalah dalam dirinya sendiri
kejahatan terbesar. Saya berani mengatakan bahwa Thrasymachus dan yang lainnya akan
sungguh-sungguh memegang bahasa yang selama ini saya ulangi, dan
kata-kata yang bahkan lebih kuat dari ini tentang keadilan dan ketidakadilan, secara kasar, seperti
Aku membayangkan, memutarbalikkan sifat asli mereka. Namun aku berbicara dengan penuh semangat
cara, seperti yang harus saya akui kepada Anda, karena saya ingin mendengar dari
Anda sisi yang berlawanan; dan saya akan meminta Anda untuk menunjukkan tidak hanya
keunggulan yang dimiliki keadilan atas ketidakadilan, tapi apa pengaruhnya?
pada pemiliknya yang menjadikan yang satu baik dan yang lainnya baik
sebuah kejahatan baginya. Dan tolong, seperti yang diminta Glaucon dari Anda, untuk mengecualikan
reputasi; karena kecuali kamu mengambil dari masing-masing dari mereka reputasi yang sebenarnya
reputasi dan menambahkan yang salah, kita akan mengatakan bahwa Anda tidak memuji
keadilan, tapi penampilannya; kita akan berpikir bahwa Anda hanya
mendesak kita untuk merahasiakan ketidakadilan, dan Anda benar-benar setuju dengan hal itu
Thrasymachus berpendapat bahwa keadilan adalah kebaikan orang lain dan
kepentingan yang lebih kuat, dan bahwa ketidakadilan adalah keuntungan pribadi seseorang dan
kepentingan, meskipun merugikan pihak yang lebih lemah. Sekarang seperti yang telah Anda akui
Bahwa keadilan adalah salah satu jenis barang paling tinggi yang diinginkan
memang untuk hasil yang mereka peroleh, namun lebih kepada hasil mereka sendiri
kepentingan--seperti penglihatan atau pendengaran atau pengetahuan atau kesehatan, atau hal-hal nyata lainnya
dan alami dan bukan hanya kebaikan konvensional--saya ingin bertanya kepada Anda dalam
pujian terhadap keadilan hanya memperhatikan satu hal: yang saya maksud adalah kebaikan hakiki
dan kejahatan yang dilakukan oleh keadilan dan ketidakadilan di dalam diri pemiliknya.
Biarkan orang lain memuji keadilan dan mengecam ketidakadilan, memperbesar pahalanya
dan menghormati yang satu dan mencaci maki yang lain; itu adalah suatu cara
berdebat yang, datang dari mereka, saya siap untuk mentolerir, tapi dari Anda
yang telah menghabiskan seluruh hidup Anda untuk mempertimbangkan pertanyaan ini,
kecuali aku mendengar hal yang sebaliknya dari bibirmu sendiri, aku mengharapkan sesuatu
lebih baik. Oleh karena itu, saya katakan, tidak hanya membuktikan kepada kita bahwa keadilan itu
lebih baik dari ketidakadilan, tapi tunjukkan apa yang mereka berdua lakukan terhadap
pemiliknya, yang menjadikan yang satu menjadi baik dan yang lainnya menjadi
kejahatan, baik yang terlihat maupun tidak terlihat oleh para dewa dan manusia.
SOKRATES - ADEIMANTUS
Saya selalu mengagumi kejeniusan Glaucon dan Adeimantus, tapi
hearing these words I was quite delighted, and said: Sons of an
illustrious father, that was not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses
which the admirer of Glaucon made in honour of you after you had
distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara:--
'Sons of Ariston,' he sang, 'divine offspring of an
illustrious hero.'
The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in
being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice,
and remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that
you are not convinced--this I infer from your general character, for
had I judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But
now, the greater my confidence in you, the greater is my difficulty in
knowing what to say. For I am in a strait between two; on the one hand
I feel that I am unequal to the task; and my inability is brought home
to me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I
made to Thrasymachus, proving, as I thought, the superiority which
justice has over injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to help, while
breath and speech remain to me; I am afraid that there would be an
impiety in being present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting
up a hand in her defence. And therefore I had best give such help as I
can.
Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question
drop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at
the truth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and
secondly, about their relative advantages. I told them, what I really
thought, that the enquiry would be of a serious nature, and would
require very good eyes. Seeing then, I said, that we are no great
wits, I think that we had better adopt a method which I may illustrate
thus; suppose that a short-sighted person had been asked by some one to
read small letters from a distance; and it occurred to some one else
that they might be found in another place which was larger and in which
the letters were larger--if they were the same and he could read the
larger letters first, and then proceed to the lesser--this would have
been thought a rare piece of good fortune.
Very true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration apply to our
enquiry?
I will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our
enquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an
individual, and sometimes as the virtue of a State.
True, he replied.
And is not a State larger than an individual?
It is.
Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and
more easily discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the
nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and
secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser
and comparing them.
That, he said, is an excellent proposal.
And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the
justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also.
I dare say.
When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our
search will be more easily discovered.
Yes, far more easily.
But ought we to attempt to construct one? I said; for to do so, as I
am inclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore.
I have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should
proceed.
A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no
one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other
origin of a State be imagined?
There can I be no other.
Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply
them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and
when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation
the body of inhabitants is termed a State.
True, he said.
And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another
receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.
Very true.
Then, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true
creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.
Of course, he replied.
Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the
condition of life and existence.
Certainly.
The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.
True.
And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great
demand: We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder,
some one else a weaver--shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps
some other purveyor to our bodily wants?
Quite right.
The barest notion of a State must include four or five men.
Clearly.
And how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labours
into a common stock?--the individual husbandman, for example, producing
for four, and labouring four times as long and as much as he need in
the provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself;
or will he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of
producing for them, but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food
in a fourth of the time, and in the remaining three-fourths of his time
be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no
partnership with others, but supplying himself all his own wants?
Adeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at
producing everything.
Probably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear you
say this, I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are
diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different
occupations.
Very true.
And will you have a work better done when the workman has many
occupations, or when he has only one?
When he has only one.
Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at
the right time?
No doubt.
For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is
at leisure; but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the
business his first object.
He must.
And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully
