rep

prophets, bear a like testimony.

On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than

the worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful

regard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and

men, in life and after death, as the most numerous and the highest

authorities tell us.  Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has

any superiority of mind or person or rank or wealth, be willing to

honour justice; or indeed to refrain from laughing when he hears

justice praised?  And even if there should be some one who is able to

disprove the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that justice is

best, still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to

forgive them, because he also knows that men are not just of their own

free will; unless, peradventure, there be some one whom the divinity

within him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has

attained knowledge of the truth--but no other man.  He only blames

injustice who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the

power of being unjust.  And this is proved by the fact that when he

obtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.

The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning

of the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were

to find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice--beginning

dengan para pahlawan kuno yang kenangannya masih tersimpan di ingatan kita,

dan berakhir dengan laki-laki di zaman kita--tidak ada yang pernah menyalahkan

ketidakadilan atau keadilan yang dipuji kecuali dengan tujuan untuk kemuliaan,

kehormatan, dan manfaat yang mengalir darinya. Tidak ada seorang pun yang pernah secara memadai

menggambarkan baik dalam bentuk syair maupun prosa tentang hakikat hakiki dari keduanya

di antaranya berdiam di dalam jiwa, dan tak terlihat oleh mata manusia atau mata dewa mana pun;

atau menunjukkan bahwa dari semua hal yang ada dalam jiwa seseorang yang ada di dalam dirinya

baginya, keadilan merupakan kebaikan terbesar, dan ketidakadilan merupakan kejahatan terbesar.

Jika ini adalah jenis yang umum, apakah Anda mencoba meyakinkan kami

ini dari masa muda kita ke atas, kita seharusnya tidak berjaga-jaga untuk

saling menjaga agar tidak berbuat jahat, tetapi setiap orang akan menjadi miliknya sendiri

penjaganya sendiri, karena takut, jika dia berbuat salah, akan menimbulkan masalah dalam dirinya sendiri

kejahatan terbesar. Saya berani mengatakan bahwa Thrasymachus dan yang lainnya akan

sungguh-sungguh memegang bahasa yang selama ini saya ulangi, dan

kata-kata yang bahkan lebih kuat dari ini tentang keadilan dan ketidakadilan, secara kasar, seperti

Aku membayangkan, memutarbalikkan sifat asli mereka. Namun aku berbicara dengan penuh semangat

cara, seperti yang harus saya akui kepada Anda, karena saya ingin mendengar dari

Anda sisi yang berlawanan; dan saya akan meminta Anda untuk menunjukkan tidak hanya

keunggulan yang dimiliki keadilan atas ketidakadilan, tapi apa pengaruhnya?

pada pemiliknya yang menjadikan yang satu baik dan yang lainnya baik

sebuah kejahatan baginya. Dan tolong, seperti yang diminta Glaucon dari Anda, untuk mengecualikan

reputasi; karena kecuali kamu mengambil dari masing-masing dari mereka reputasi yang sebenarnya

reputasi dan menambahkan yang salah, kita akan mengatakan bahwa Anda tidak memuji

keadilan, tapi penampilannya; kita akan berpikir bahwa Anda hanya

mendesak kita untuk merahasiakan ketidakadilan, dan Anda benar-benar setuju dengan hal itu

Thrasymachus berpendapat bahwa keadilan adalah kebaikan orang lain dan

kepentingan yang lebih kuat, dan bahwa ketidakadilan adalah keuntungan pribadi seseorang dan

kepentingan, meskipun merugikan pihak yang lebih lemah. Sekarang seperti yang telah Anda akui

Bahwa keadilan adalah salah satu jenis barang paling tinggi yang diinginkan

memang untuk hasil yang mereka peroleh, namun lebih kepada hasil mereka sendiri

kepentingan--seperti penglihatan atau pendengaran atau pengetahuan atau kesehatan, atau hal-hal nyata lainnya

dan alami dan bukan hanya kebaikan konvensional--saya ingin bertanya kepada Anda dalam

pujian terhadap keadilan hanya memperhatikan satu hal: yang saya maksud adalah kebaikan hakiki

dan kejahatan yang dilakukan oleh keadilan dan ketidakadilan di dalam diri pemiliknya.

Biarkan orang lain memuji keadilan dan mengecam ketidakadilan, memperbesar pahalanya

dan menghormati yang satu dan mencaci maki yang lain; itu adalah suatu cara

berdebat yang, datang dari mereka, saya siap untuk mentolerir, tapi dari Anda

yang telah menghabiskan seluruh hidup Anda untuk mempertimbangkan pertanyaan ini,

kecuali aku mendengar hal yang sebaliknya dari bibirmu sendiri, aku mengharapkan sesuatu

lebih baik. Oleh karena itu, saya katakan, tidak hanya membuktikan kepada kita bahwa keadilan itu

lebih baik dari ketidakadilan, tapi tunjukkan apa yang mereka berdua lakukan terhadap

pemiliknya, yang menjadikan yang satu menjadi baik dan yang lainnya menjadi

kejahatan, baik yang terlihat maupun tidak terlihat oleh para dewa dan manusia.

SOKRATES - ADEIMANTUS

Saya selalu mengagumi kejeniusan Glaucon dan Adeimantus, tapi

hearing these words I was quite delighted, and said: Sons of an

illustrious father, that was not a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses

which the admirer of Glaucon made in honour of you after you had

distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara:--

    'Sons of Ariston,' he sang, 'divine offspring of an

    illustrious hero.'

The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in

being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice,

and remaining unconvinced by your own arguments.  And I do believe that

you are not convinced--this I infer from your general character, for

had I judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you.  But

now, the greater my confidence in you, the greater is my difficulty in

knowing what to say.  For I am in a strait between two; on the one hand

I feel that I am unequal to the task; and my inability is brought home

to me by the fact that you were not satisfied with the answer which I

made to Thrasymachus, proving, as I thought, the superiority which

justice has over injustice.  And yet I cannot refuse to help, while

breath and speech remain to me; I am afraid that there would be an

impiety in being present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting

up a hand in her defence.  And therefore I had best give such help as I

can.

Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question

drop, but to proceed in the investigation.  They wanted to arrive at

the truth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and

secondly, about their relative advantages.  I told them, what I really

thought, that the enquiry would be of a serious nature, and would

require very good eyes.  Seeing then, I said, that we are no great

wits, I think that we had better adopt a method which I may illustrate

thus; suppose that a short-sighted person had been asked by some one to

read small letters from a distance; and it occurred to some one else

that they might be found in another place which was larger and in which

the letters were larger--if they were the same and he could read the

larger letters first, and then proceed to the lesser--this would have

been thought a rare piece of good fortune.

Very true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration apply to our

enquiry?

I will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our

enquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an

individual, and sometimes as the virtue of a State.

True, he replied.

And is not a State larger than an individual?

It is.

Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and

more easily discernible.  I propose therefore that we enquire into the

nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and

secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser

and comparing them.

That, he said, is an excellent proposal.

And if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the

justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also.

I dare say.

When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our

search will be more easily discovered.

Yes, far more easily.

But ought we to attempt to construct one?  I said; for to do so, as I

am inclined to think, will be a very serious task.  Reflect therefore.

I have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should

proceed.

A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no

one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants.  Can any other

origin of a State be imagined?

There can I be no other.

Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply

them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and

when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation

the body of inhabitants is termed a State.

True, he said.

And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another

receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.

Very true.

Then, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true

creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.

Of course, he replied.

Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the

condition of life and existence.

Certainly.

The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.

True.

And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great

demand: We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder,

some one else a weaver--shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps

some other purveyor to our bodily wants?

Quite right.

The barest notion of a State must include four or five men.

Clearly.

And how will they proceed?  Will each bring the result of his labours

into a common stock?--the individual husbandman, for example, producing

for four, and labouring four times as long and as much as he need in

the provision of food with which he supplies others as well as himself;

or will he have nothing to do with others and not be at the trouble of

producing for them, but provide for himself alone a fourth of the food

in a fourth of the time, and in the remaining three-fourths of his time

be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes, having no

partnership with others, but supplying himself all his own wants?

Adeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at

producing everything.

Probably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear you

say this, I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are

diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different

occupations.

Very true.

And will you have a work better done when the workman has many

occupations, or when he has only one?

When he has only one.

Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at

the right time?

No doubt.

For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is

at leisure; but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the

business his first object.

He must.

And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully